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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-1292 
___________ 
 
BARRY E. SHELLEY, 
  Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SOMERSET COUNTY JAIL; WARDEN, SOMERSET COUNTY JAIL 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-04-cv-00001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joy Flowers Conti 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 3, 2014 
 
Before:  AMBRO, VANASKIE and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 6, 2014) 
___________ 
 
OPINION
*
 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
*
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Pro se appellant Barry Shelley appeals the District Court’s order enforcing a 
settlement agreement with defendants Somerset County Jail and Timothy Mapes, the 
jail’s warden.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the District Court’s order. 
 Shelley initiated the case in 2004, filing a complaint in the District Court alleging 
that the defendants failed to protect him from another prisoner in violation of his rights 
under the Eighth Amendment.  In 2008, after various proceedings not relevant here, the 
District Court appointed counsel to represent Shelley.  Magistrate Judge Pesto held a 
series of settlement conferences with the parties, and on April 19, 2011, the defendants 
agreed to pay Shelley $5,000 in exchange for his withdrawing his failure-to-protect 
claim.  After those terms were apparently agreed to, however, Shelley made the 
additional request that Somerset County waive the $3,420 in fines that he owed.  Counsel 
for defendants promised to look into this, and the conference ended.  On August 21, 
2012, counsel for the defendants informed the Magistrate Judge that they would pay the 
agreed-upon $5,000 to Shelley and also pay to discharge his $3,420 in fines.  Along with 
this letter, counsel forwarded a release to Shelley. 
For reasons that are not entirely clear, Shelley refused to sign the release.  Due to 
her unhappiness with this decision, Shelley’s counsel requested, and was granted, leave 
to withdraw.  The defendants then filed a motion seeking to enforce what they perceived 
to be a binding settlement agreement.  The Magistrate Judge concluded that Shelley had 
agreed to settle the case, and thus recommended that the District Court grant the motion.  
Shelley objected, claiming that he had not authorized his attorney to settle and had 
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actually asked her to request a jury trial, and that a written agreement had never been 
signed.  The District Court overruled the objections and approved and adopted the report 
and recommendation.  The Court concluded that an oral settlement agreement was fully 
enforceable and that the parties had reached an agreement at the April 19, 2011 
settlement conference.  Therefore, the Court dismissed the case with prejudice and 
ordered the defendants to pay over $5,000 for Shelley and $3,420 to cover the fines.  
Shelley then filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. 
The validity and enforceability of a settlement agreement is governed by state 
contract law.  See Am. Eagle Outfitters v. Lyle & Scott Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 
2009); Tiernan v. Devoe, 923 F.2d 1024, 1032-33 & n.6 (3d Cir. 1991).  Under 
Pennsylvania law, “the test for enforceability of an agreement is whether both parties 
have manifested an intention to be bound by its terms and whether the terms are 
sufficiently definite to be specifically enforced.”  Channel Home Ctrs. v. Grossman, 795 
F.2d 291, 298-99 (3d Cir. 1986).  The first of those questions is factual in nature, and the 
Court will review the District Court’s factual determinations for clear error.  Tiernan, 923 
F.2d at 1031 n.5.  The second involves a legal conclusion, which the Court will review de 
novo.  Am. Eagle Outfitters, 584 F.3d at 585. 
Here, the District Court, adopting the finding of the Magistrate Judge, see Ross v. 
Varano, 712 F.3d 784, 789 n.2 (3d Cir. 2013), concluded that the parties agreed to settle 
the case at the April 19, 2011 settlement conference.  This was not clearly erroneous.  In 
their filings in the District Court, counsel for defendants and former counsel for Shelley 
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both represented that Shelley had agreed at the conference to settle his claim for $5,000; 
crucially, the Magistrate Judge, who was present throughout the negotiations, agreed with 
counsels’ recollection.  See Lynch, Inc. v. SamataMason, Inc., 279 F.3d 487, 489-92 (7th 
Cir. 2002) (magistrate judge’s recollection of terms of oral settlement sufficient for 
enforcement).
1
  While Shelley apparently added an extra term — the discharge of his 
fines — after the agreement had been reached, he “cannot now seek to invalidate the 
agreement by asserting essential terms of the agreement after settlement negotiations 
were complete.”  Storms ex rel. Storms v. O’Malley, 779 A.2d 548, 558 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2001). 
On appeal, Shelley argues that the agreement is not enforceable because it was 
never reduced to writing and because he had told his counsel that he wanted to proceed to 
trial.  These arguments are not persuasive.  First, it is well established that “[w]here the 
parties have agreed on the essential terms of a contract, the fact that they intend to 
formalize their agreement in writing but have not yet done so does not prevent 
enforcement of such agreement.”  Mazzella v. Koken, 739 A.2d 531, 536 (Pa. 1999).  
Second, while Shelley contends that he wished to take his claim to trial, there is no 
                                              
1
 We recognize that the Magistrate Judge, in a contemporaneous minute entry, described 
the settlement as “tentative.”  However, given the deference we accord judges in 
interpreting their own statements, see generally In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., 718 
F.3d 236, 244 (3d Cir. 2013), and the Magistrate Judge’s subsequent, more detailed 
factual findings, we are satisfied that the Magistrate Judge meant merely that the parties 
still planned to memorialize their agreement, not that no binding agreement had been 
reached.  See generally Mastroni-Mucker v. Allstate Ins. Co., 976 A.2d 510, 522 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2009) (enforcing an oral contract containing similar terns). 
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suggestion that he expressed this desire at the settlement conference.  See, e.g., Am. 
Eagle Outfitters, 584 F.3d at 582 (explaining that the relevant inquiry is objective, not 
focused on the “inner, subjective intent of the parties”).  (Shelley’s claim that he would 
resolve his case only via trial is also belied by his appellate brief, in which he asks the 
Court to remand the case “for settlement and/or trial.”).  In any case, Shelley has 
provided us with no basis to conclude that the Magistrate Judge’s recollection of 
conference is clearly erroneous.  See, e.g., Gevas v. Ghosh, 566 F.3d 717, 719 (7th Cir. 
2009). 
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order.2   
                                              
2
 At the very end of his appellate brief, Shelley states that if the Court “cannot see 
plaintiff’s points named,” he wishes to voluntarily dismiss his appeal.  Because of the 
condition that Shelley placed on this “motion” — that is, the request becomes effective 
only if this Court determines that Shelley’s appeal lacked merit — the defendants were 
required to file a response brief and we were required to review the parties’ arguments.  
Accordingly, Shelley’s request is not “in the interest of justice or fairness,” Am. Auto 
Mfrs. Ass'n v. Mass. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 31 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 1994), and we deny it, 
see Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804, 807 (11th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (denying Rule 42(b) 
motion because it was not presented until after briefing was completed and the Court had 
invested time in reviewing the appeal). 
